In this chapter, I propose a new framework for extended epistemology, based on a second-wave approach to extended cognition. The framework is inclusive, in that it takes into account the complex interplay between the diverse embodiments of extended knowers and the salient properties of technological artifacts, as well as the environment in which they are embedded. Thus it both emphasizes and exploits the complementary roles played by these different elements. Finally, I motivate and explain this framework by applying it to (...) a case of interaction with contemporary technologies. (shrink)

Research on individual differences in facing the COVID-19 pandemic seems to be crucial in order to design diverse and highly effective intervention strategies. This study uses a sample of 302 North American participants who were recruited through the crowdsourcing platform ProA; different profiles were established, profiling variables of interest in facing the COVID-19 outbreak. Socio-demographic and psychological (personality traits, gratitude, life purpose, and religiosity) variables were explored. These results are of interest if we want to deepen the study of individual (...) differences at both a theoretical and applied level. (shrink)

In De veritate I.2, Thomas Aquinas claims that “to every true act of understanding there must correspond some being and likewise to every being there corresponds a true act of understanding.” For Aquinas, the ratio of truth consists in a conformity between intellect and being. This account of truth, however, doesnot appear to allow for a certain class of truths, namely those that are about nonbeings. Many think that it is true that ‘no chimeras exist,’ that ‘blindness can becaused by (...) exposure to bright lights,’ and that ‘evil should be avoided.’ Yet, in each of these cases of truth, there does not appear to be a being to which the intellectconforms. In this paper, I will explore the ways in which Aquinas’s notion of truth as “conformity to being” is able to accommodate truths about nonbeings. (shrink)

The verb “to conjure” is a complex one, for it includes in its standard definition a great range of possible actions or operations, not all of them equivalent, or even compatible. In its most common usage, “to conjure” means to perform an act of magic or to invoke a supernatural force, by casting a spell, say, or performing a particular ritual or rite. But “to conjure” is also to influence, to beg, to command or constrain, to charm, to bewitch, to (...) move or convey, to imagine, to visualize, to call to mind, or to remember. —Rachael DeLue 2012, para 1.When we create with our Brown hands, feminine energy, and full spirits, we conjure. To exist, survive, and thrive in these bodies is a continuous act of conjuring. Our walks conjure. Our smiles conjure. Our tears conjure. Our laughs conjure. Our words conjure. Our artworks are conjurings. We, a Black/Filipina-American woman, a Dominican-American, and a Black-American woman, are guided by our solidarity with one another and all other Black and Brown female identifying persons whose raced and gendered subjectivities exist both inside and outside of colonization, white supremacy, and patriarchy. We bring to life our colored imaginations and curiosities, and share them with the world. We are united by our need for safety, autonomy as beings, dissolution of trauma, and desire to ask, “What would happen if I…?” Imaginative, curious Women of Color founded the underground railroad, guided captured Africans and Tainos to the mountains, ignited the Civil Rights Movement, organized laborers and immigrants, birthed the #BlackLivesMatter Movement, conceived the #MeToo Movement, and so much more. Like our kindred counterparts, we have an unrelenting urge to examine, question, wonder, desire, speak to, lead, be curious, and “conjure.” As practicing artists and art educators, our critical arts-based practices are grounded in intersectional feminisms like Womanism, Black Feminist Theory, and Chicana Feminist Theory, which allow us to do these very things. (shrink)

Extended cognition brings with it a particular phenomenology. It has been argued that when an artifact is integrated into an agent’s cognitive system, it becomes transparent in use to the cognizing subject. In this paper, I challenge some of the assumptions underlying how the transparency of artifacts is described in extended cognition theory. To this end, I offer two arguments. First, I make room for some forms of conscious thought and attention within extended cognitive routines, and I question the close (...) association drawn between attention and effort. Second, I vindicate the importance of paying careful attention to individual differences and the diverse ways in which bodies and technologies can be experienced. I end by offering some hints toward an alternative, and more accurate, account of the phenomenology of extended cognition. (shrink)

According to the Extended knowledge dilemma, first formulated by Clark (Synthese 192:3757–3775, 2015) and subsequently reformulated by Carter et al. (in: Carter, Clark, Kallestrup, Palermos, Pritchard (eds) Extended epistemology, Oxford Univer- sity Press, Oxford, pp 331–351, 2018a), an agent’s interaction with a device can either give rise to knowledge or extended cognition, but not both at the same time. The dilemma rests on two substantive commitments: first, that knowledge by a subject requires that the subject be aware to some extent (...) of some features of that knowledge’s sources and, second, that cognitive processes can only be extended if the subject is mostly unaware of the external object. The overwhelming response to the dilemma by proponents of extended knowledge has been to reconcile the demands of knowl- edge with the requirement that genuine extended cognition must lack any conscious encountering of the external artifact that features in the putative extended cognitive process. My approach, thus far unexplored, will be the opposite: I show how extended cognition can be made compatible with a wide range of agential attitudes, including an active form of epistemic hygiene. Consequently, I open the door for a new way of vindicating the possibility of extended knowledge, and call into question some assumptions that lie at the core of extended cognition theory. (shrink)

Miranda Fricker has introduced the insightful notion of epistemic injustice in the philosophical debate, thus bridging concerns of social epistemology with questions that arise in the area of social and cultural studies. I concentrate my analysis of her treatment of testimonial injustice. According to Fricker, the central cases of testimonial injustice are cases of identity injustice in which hearers rely on stereotypes to assess the credibility of their interlocutors. I try here to broaden the analysis of that testimonial injustice by (...) indicating other mechanisms that bias our credibility assessments. In my perspective, the use of identity stereotypes is just one case among many biases in our credibility judgments. (shrink)

This dissertation is an ontological investigation of value. The thesis is this: Value is a moment founded on a real entity and, in this sense, value is real. I argue that this thesis is true for all objects in the domain of value by looking at three distinct categories of value: economic value, aesthetic value, and moral value. And I demonstrate by means of advancing definitions, and the necessary and sufficient conditions for each of these three categories of value, that (...) this thesis is the essential glue that holds all values in the realm of social reality as part of the genus value. There are two restrictions to this thesis. One restriction is that the real existence of value is possible only if there is a relation of correspondence between a value judgment and its referent. A false value judgment, then, fails to correspond to its intentional target so there is no possible value. The other restriction is that the value entities are either concrete objects that have at least temporally come into being, or actual states of affairs with a spatial and temporal location. Both of these restrictions combined imply that no future states of affairs, or objects which either have not or cannot come into being, can be objects of value. This dissertation draws from sources in the Central European philosophical tradition. (shrink)

In chapter 4 of Autonomous Knowledge: Radical Enhancement, Autonomy and the Future of Knowing (OUP, 2021), Carter takes on the question of whether there is an epistemic autonomy condition on know-how, e.g. one that might rule out cases of radical performance enhancement as genuine cases of know-how. In this paper, I examine Carter’s proposal and identify an asymmetry in the way his epistemic autonomy condition is applied to enhanced and non-enhanced instances of know-how. In particular, it seems that either an (...) autonomy condition is required for all forms of knowledge-how or it is not. If it is, then a potential worry is that young children do not manifest their know-how when doing things that we would normally be inclined to say they know how to do. If it is not, then young children do manifest some forms of non-enhanced know-how. While Carter chooses the second option, I argue that it is better to choose the first one, that is, to claim that all know-how needs to be epistemically autonomous along the lines he has described. I also show how this does not exclude young children from knowing how to do things. (shrink)

In ordinary life we think that we know many things about the world. I know that I am sitting here. I know that it is not raining. I know that Reagan is President--and many more interesting things. We also think that we know things of a more general sort, e.g., that there are tables, chairs, physical objects, other people. Most of the time, we believe that we have good reasons for our beliefs. Descartes, Hume and Russell, however, as a result (...) of philosophical reflection, discover that we cannot know, nor do we have any good reason for our beliefs. ;Thomas Reid and G. E. Moore reject the sceptic's negative conclusions. They think scepticism is absurd, ridiculous and contrary to common sense. It is contrary to what we believe in ordinary life. These commonsense philosophers do not find the sceptical arguments compelling. They argue that scepticism is not as well supported as the ordinary view that we do know. ;A large part of my dissertation is a defense of scepticism against these commonsense philosophers' objections. I argue that Reid and Moore fail to appreciate the power and significance of scepticism. They fail to understand the relation between philosophical scepticism and ordinary life. A proper understanding of Humean scepticism thwarts any attempt to argue from ordinary life against scepticism. ;Still, I argue that Hume was concerned, indeed distressed, by the conflict between scepticism and ordinary life. But he does not think that conflict casts doubt on the truth of scepticism. I argue that Hume feels "philosophical melancholy" over his discoveries about human nature and the human condition. But his distress is totally at the philosophical level. That is because the recognition of the conflict between ordinary life and philosophical reflection is distressing at the philosophical level. I argue that Hume is right to feel the distress that he does, but I also maintain that he should be dissatisfied with his negative appraisal of our epistemic position, just as we are. ;Reid and Moore are right to be dissatisfied with scepticism, even though their attempts to legitimize that dissatisfaction fail. Their failure to appreciate the nature and importance of scepticism, however, is instructive because it forces us to explain why there is thought to be a problem about knowledge. They force us to express what is indeed difficult to express, namely, what it is that we want to understand when we undertake a philosophical investigation of knowledge. . . . UMI. (shrink)

The Action Theory of Exchanges is based on three main assumptions: i) an exchange is motivated by people having convergent preferences, ii) people exchange actions, and iii) offers and acceptances are crucial parts of an exchange and they bring about rights and obligations. The main aim of this paper is to discuss three aspects of this theory to better understand its ontological implications and, possibly, improve it. I first examine the expression “transferring the ownership” by showing an ontological issue behind (...) it; after that, I propose an interpretation that might solve this issue. I then show that convergent preferences are not enough to motivate an exchange; accordingly, one has to introduce two more preferences possessed by the agents. I finally propose a characterization of buying and selling (and buyer and seller) which, in addition to being compatible with the Action Theory of Exchanges, has the advantage of accounting for both monetary and non-monetary exchanges. (shrink)

This paper examines what it takes for a state of knowledge-how to be extended (i.e. partly constituted by entities external to the organism) within an anti-intellectualist approach to knowledge-how. I begin by examining an account of extended knowledge-how developed by Carter, J. Adam, and Boleslaw Czarnecki. 2016 [“Extended Knowledge-How.” Erkenntnis 81 (2): 259–273], and argue that it fails to properly distinguish between cognitive outsourcing and extended knowing-how. I then introduce a solution to this problem which rests on the distribution of (...) tasks between agent and non-biological entity. On closer inspection, I show that this solution is ultimately unsatisfactory, though its failure is instructive as it illuminates the important role played by an agent’s skilled interaction with an external entity. Drawing on key anti-intellectualist ideas, as well as on insight from cognitive psychology, I propose an account according to which what ultimately matters for extending knowledge-how is whether a hybrid ability is self-regulated. In closing, I illuminate the practical value of extended knowledge-how vis-à-vis cognitive outsourcing. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the epistemology of trust and testimony should take into account the pragmatics of communication in order to gain insight about the responsibilities speakers and hearers share in the epistemic access they gain through communication. Communication is a rich process of information exchange in which epistemic standards are negotiated by interlocutors. I discuss examples which show the contextual adjustment of these standards as the conversation goes on. Our sensitivity to the contextual dimension of epistemic standards (...) make us more responsible communicators. (shrink)

The aim of this commentary is to complement Haslanger’s view of cognition as a skill shaped by culture. I start by presenting an empirically oriented account of the process of enculturation based on the cognitive integration framework. I then illustrate the active role of material (and not just symbolic) culture in cognition by drawing on extended cognition theory. Finally, I argue that embedding Haslanger’s work within these two theories of cognition better serves the objectives of her project and, at the (...) same time, promotes a critical philosophy of cognitive science. (shrink)

This paper discusses Scotus’s view of how God knows sins by analyzing texts from his discussions of God’s permission of sin and predestination. I show that Scotus departed from his standard theory of how God knows contingents when explaining how God knows sins. God cannot know sins by knowing a first-order act of his will, as he knows other contingents according to Scotus, since God does not directly will sins. I suggest that Scotus’s recognition that his standard theory of God’s (...) knowledge of contingents could not account for how God knows sins may have contributed to his ultimate rejection of this theory. (shrink)

A notion that comes from the toolbox of social sciences, trust has become a mainstream epistemological concept in the last 15 years. The notion of epistemic trust has been distinguished from the notion of moral and social trust, the former involves kinds of inferences about the others that are rationally justifiable. If I trust a scientist about the efficacy of a vaccine against COVID-19, I must have an epistemic justification. I am therefore rationally justified in trusting her because I have (...) an epistemic reason to justify my belief. I will challenge the distinction between epistemic and moral and social trust by pointing to several social indicators that contribute to our trustful attitudes in a reasonable way. Social indicators of reputation, values and moral commitments to values are indispensable strategies to come to trust in a rational way, an attitude that is different from merely believing the truth. I also point out the fragility of trusting experts’ reputations and stress the importance of avoiding biases in trusting other people’s reputations to make our deference to experts more robust. (shrink)

1966, the inaugural year of China’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, was also the thirtieth anniversary of Lu Xun’s death. Quotations from and praise of China’s best known and preeminent modern writer were in abundance that year and an official commemorative event, reportedly attended by more than seventy thousand people, was held in Beijing. The anniversary date presented the Maoist state with a prime opportunity for boosting the cultural and intellectual authority of their doctrinal assertions by association with Lu Xun. In (...) asking what Lu Xun was in 1966, I seek to bring to view the thingness of his afterlife (or afterlives) under CCP rule. This paper discusses how the Maoist treatment of Lu Xun turned him into a political icon, to add aesthetic value to Mao Zedong Thought. Insofar as aesthetics turns on what can be felt, heard, seen, sensed, touched, or imagined, aestheticization is generally accompanied by a certain process of reification. I thus consider the concrete instances by which people came to experience Lu Xun—such as selected quotations from Lu Xun, Chairman Mao’s formulations about Lu Xun, and images of the writer in poster art—focusing in particular on the widely publicized speeches presented at the official commemoration of his death in October 1966. Since the 1980s, these 1966 commemorations have been routinely disparaged in China as an aberration. To take the Maoist version of Lu Xun seriously as the careful construction of an aesthetic object is to do more than elucidate its ideological abuse of Lu Xun. By engaging productively with the Maoist craving for an ideal revolutionary comportment, we may yet catch a glimpse of the kind of world it took for Lu Xun to make sense as a Maoist icon. Without this Maoist intensity of feeling, there would not have been the post-Maoist preoccupation with recovering or defending, as it were, Lu Xun’s true or real form (if such a phenomenologically pure act is even possible). (shrink)

This paper examines what it takes for a state of knowledge-how to be extended (i.e. partly constituted by entities external to the organism) within an anti-intellectualist approach to knowledge- how. I begin by examining an account of extended knowledge- how developed by Carter, J. Adam, and Boleslaw Czarnecki. 2016 [“Extended Knowledge-How.” Erkenntnis 81 (2): 259–273], and argue that it fails to properly distinguish between cognitive outsourcing and extended knowing-how. I then introduce a solution to this problem which rests on the (...) distribution of tasks between agent and non-biological entity. On closer inspection, I show that this solution is ultimately unsatisfactory, though its failure is instructive as it illuminates the important role played by an agent’s skilled interaction with an external entity. Drawing on key anti-intellectualist ideas, as well as on insight from cognitive psychology, I propose an account according to which what ultimately matters for extending knowledge-how is whether a hybrid ability is self-regulated. In closing, I illuminate the practical value of extended knowledge-how vis-à-vis cognitive outsourcing. (shrink)

In this paper I try to challenge some received views about the role and the function of the traditional academic practice of publishing papers in peer?reviewed journals. I argue that our publishing practices today are rather based on passively accepted social norms and humdrum work habits than on actual needs for communicating the advancements of our research. By analysing some examples of devices and practices that are based on tacitly accepted norms, such as the Citation Index and the new role (...) of DOI attributions in digital publishing, I advocate an epistemically vigilant stance not only towards our ways of acquiring knowledge, but also towards the implicit norms we accept when we produce research. (shrink)

Following the poetics of Gastón Bachelard, the Mexican poet Enriqueta Ochoa takes us to the intensity of the being across the metaphorical configuration of subjectivity. We are a bonfire, us humans, a wasps’ nest, according to the generating principle of the cosmic image of fire in Electra's Return. But this wasps’ nest, before appearing as despair, is a desire. I carus principle is applied in the body that burns for the illusion, for the enchantment of freedom and for the desire (...) as manifestation of fire. In this respect, one of the most important visions in Enriqueta Ochoa’s poem is that of the wasps’ nest, metaphor of the combustion that is generated in flames. Burning is a verb close to human existence. Burning is proof of the existential suffering, of being alive. From the image of the wasps’ nest, the fire turns into the mark of desperation as sting of desire. (shrink)

Following the poetics of Gastón Bachelard, the Mexican poet Enriqueta Ochoa takes us to the intensity of the being across the metaphorical configuration of subjectivity. We are a bonfire, us humans, a wasps’ nest, according to the generating principle of the cosmic image of fire in Electra's Return. But this wasps’ nest, before appearing as despair, is a desire. I carus principle is applied in the body that burns for the illusion, for the enchantment of freedom and for the desire (...) as manifestation of fire. In this respect, one of the most important visions in Enriqueta Ochoa’s poem is that of the wasps’ nest, metaphor of the combustion that is generated in flames. Burning is a verb close to human existence. Burning is proof of the existential suffering, of being alive. From the image of the wasps’ nest, the fire turns into the mark of desperation as sting of desire. (shrink)

Following the poetics of Gastón Bachelard, the Mexican poet Enriqueta Ochoa takes us to the intensity of the being across the metaphorical configuration of subjectivity. We are a bonfire, us humans, a wasps’ nest, according to the generating principle of the cosmic image of fire in Electra's Return. But this wasps’ nest, before appearing as despair, is a desire. I carus principle is applied in the body that burns for the illusion, for the enchantment of freedom and for the desire (...) as manifestation of fire. In this respect, one of the most important visions in Enriqueta Ochoa’s poem is that of the wasps’ nest, metaphor of the combustion that is generated in flames. Burning is a verb close to human existence. Burning is proof of the existential suffering, of being alive. From the image of the wasps’ nest, the fire turns into the mark of desperation as sting of desire. (shrink)

Street formulated a Darwinian Dilemma for realist theories of value. Much criticism of her formulation of the dilemma targets the second horn, posed by the scientifically implausible assumption of a tracking relation between our attitudes and evaluative truth. This paper shows how a recent wave of metaethical realism, most prominently defended by Scanlon, succeeds without a tracking relation and thus avoids the Darwinian Dilemma in Street's formulation. However, Scanlon's approach, which builds on the concept of a reason relation and defends (...) a metaphysically pluralist, domain‐specific conception of truth, runs into another version of the Darwinian Dilemma. The problem is not that Scanlon's realism assumes a tracking relation but that it assumes what I call reason monolithism – the idea that there is one possible expression of the faculty of reason and that this cognitive faculty could not be otherwise, which is scientifically implausible on similar grounds. (shrink)

We monitor the informational environment and catch reputational cues, gather signals from our informants and develop our trustful attitudes in context. I present an epistemology of reputation as a way of using social configurations to acquire information. I review the definitions of reputation that exist in the social sciences, stress the importance of the relational/social dimension of reputation as a property of entities, and put forward a definition of reputation suitable for epistemology. I then sketch social configurations that allow us (...) to extract reputational information and some typical heuristics we use to navigate the social information around us. (shrink)

I present a definition of expertise that involves both epistemic and political authority. I argue that these two forms of authority require different treatments and defend a political epistemology that articulates a division of cognitive labor between political and epistemic authority.

Should fear guide our actions and governments’ political decisions? A leitmotiv of common sense is that emotions are tricky, they blur our rational capacity of estimating utilities in order to plan action and thus they should be banned from any account of our rational expectations. In this paper I argue that an “heuristic of fear” is the appropriate attitude to adopt in order to cope with extreme risks. I thus defend the Precautionary Principle against the criticism put forward by Cass (...) Sunstein and other authors on the basis of a new analysis of extreme risks or “ruin-problems”. (shrink)

In De veritate I.2, Thomas Aquinas claims that “to every true act of understanding there must correspond some being and likewise to every being there corresponds a true act of understanding.” For Aquinas, the ratio of truth consists in a conformity between intellect and being. This account of truth, however, doesnot appear to allow for a certain class of truths, namely those that are about nonbeings. Many think that it is true that ‘no chimeras exist,’ that ‘blindness can becaused by (...) exposure to bright lights,’ and that ‘evil should be avoided.’ Yet, in each of these cases of truth, there does not appear to be a being to which the intellectconforms. In this paper, I will explore the ways in which Aquinas’s notion of truth as “conformity to being” is able to accommodate truths about nonbeings. (shrink)

Despite the frequent refrain concerning the paucity of attention paid to pneumatology in the theological discipline, a review of literature over the past fifty years reveals that pneumatology is an idea whose time has come. However, while writings on the Holy Spirit are manifold, systematically developed pneumatologies are not. In response to this reality, this essay explores four contextually constructed pneumatologies based in communities experiencing marginalisation, oppression, and exclusion: Latin American, womanist, Latinx, and black. These pneumatologies not only represent particular (...) ethnic, social, and racial contexts, but also express a particular hermeneutical perspective on the presence and action of the Holy Spirit, i.e., that of liberation. This perspective reflects the conviction that each genuine act of the Holy Spirit is essentially liberating—individually, socially, politically, ecclesially, and theologically. While other effects accompany this experience, liberation emerges at the heart of the encounter with Spirit. Exemplifying this in multiple ways are pneumatology as the irruption of the Spirit by liberation theologian José Comblin, pneumatology as the memory of the future by womanist Linda E. Thomas, the Holy Spirit as the improvisation of God by black theologian David Emmanuel Goatley, and the Spirit dwelling in convivencia by Latinx theologian Néstor Medina. (shrink)

Following the poetics of Gastón Bachelard, the Mexican poet Enriqueta Ochoa takes us to the intensity of the being across the metaphorical configuration of subjectivity. We are a bonfire, us humans, a wasps’ nest, according to the generating principle of the cosmic image of fire in Electra's Return. But this wasps’ nest, before appearing as despair, is a desire. I carus principle is applied in the body that burns for the illusion, for the enchantment of freedom and for the desire (...) as manifestation of fire. In this respect, one of the most important visions in Enriqueta Ochoa’s poem is that of the wasps’ nest, metaphor of the combustion that is generated in flames. Burning is a verb close to human existence. Burning is proof of the existential suffering, of being alive. From the image of the wasps’ nest, the fire turns into the mark of desperation as sting of desire. (shrink)

Neuroscientist Maxwell Bennett and philosopher Peter Hacker defend the need to eradicate the mereological fallacy of cognitive neuroscience. This fallacy attributes to the parts of an animal psychological predicates that make sense only when applied to the whole animal. In contrast, philosopher Daniel Dennett argues that it is possible to explain behavior and cognitive abilities by applying the Intentional Stance to the brain, a stance that attributes increasingly simple psychological capacities to increasingly less intelligent homunculi. So, among other things, taking (...) the intentional stance requires i) attributing psychological predicates to the brain and its parts, and ii) gradually replacing psychological predicates with non-psychological predicates.If the criticism of Bennett and Hacker is accepted, these requirements lead to two dilemmas. According to the first, the intentional stance would be inapplicable or fallacious: because it implies incurring in the mereological fallacy, and to deny is equivalent to rejecting the intentional stance. The horns of the second dilemma are dualism and explanatory vacuity: can be interpreted in a dualistic sense because it presupposes the distinction between psychological and non-psychological predicates; however, failing to respect generates an infinite regress. In this article I intend to show that both dilemmas are resolved by focusing on the details of the relationship between the intentional stance and the design stance. (shrink)

The aim of this commentary is to complement Haslanger’s view of cognition as a skill shaped by culture. I start by presenting an empirically oriented account of the process of enculturation based on the cognitive integration framework. I then illustrate the active role of material (and not just symbolic) culture in cognition by drawing on extended cognition theory. Finally, I argue that embedding Haslanger’s work within these two theories of cognition better serves the objectives of her project and, at the (...) same time, promotes a critical philosophy of cognitive science. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Do People Defy Generalizations?Examining the Case Against Evidence-Based Medicine in PsychiatryGloria Ayob (bio)KeywordsPhilosophy, psychiatry, action, contentEvidence-based medicine (EBM) in psychiatry presupposes that it is possible to track the causal efficacy of treatments for psychopathological conditions using scientific methods. One central aim of EBM is to ascertain the causally efficacious component of the treatment of a given condition. This is done by collecting data from randomized control trials, where this (...) data are of groups rather than of individuals (Bolton, 2008).EBM is felt by many to have significant limitations when applied in the field of psychiatric medicine, and these limitations are thought to arise owing to a particular fact about psychiatry, namely that the subject of psychiatry is the human person. For brevity, I will refer to this broad claim as the Unsuitability Intuition (UI), which can be stated as follows:The UI is the intuition that EBM is somehow unsuitable for dealing with people.The aims of this paper are twofold. First, I try to pinpoint the source(s) of anxiety about EBM, and therein to clarify the exact sense(s) in which EBM might be said to be unsuitable or problematic. Second, I evaluate the validity of these concerns, focusing on two broad interrelated questions: (1) Is it actually something about human persons that creates trouble for EBM in psychiatry, and if so, what is the nature of this trouble?; and (2) What assumptions about EBM are made such that EBM is problematic in light of the fact that the subject of psychiatry is the human person?As an empirical point, EBM in psychiatry is applied to two methods of treatment: psychotropic drugs, and more recently, cognitive–behavioral therapies. Each of these throws up slightly different issues in light of the two questions just identified. To accommodate relevant differences, I structure this paper as follows. Bearing in mind that the overall aim of the paper is to scrutinize the intuition that EBM is somehow unsuitable for dealing with people, I begin by exploring one common suggestion as to what underpins this intuition: The problem we are confronted with, in applying EBM to people, is the problem of applying generalizations to particular instances (Wifstad 2008). To anticipate, I argue that this worry concerns a problem that, in fact, applies to the scientific method in general. That is, it is not a [End Page 167] problem arising specifically from the fact that the subject of psychiatry is the human person. So if this is the worry about EBM, then as it stands, it does not satisfactorily explain the intuition that EBM is somehow unsuitable for dealing with people.Against this, the UI theorist might defend his intuition by attempting to specify the reasons why persons, unlike physical material, present a special challenge to the scientific method presupposed by EBM. One way of doing this is to point out that the determinants of human behavior cannot be captured by generalizations (and in particular, by causal generalizations). There are two ways of worrying about EBM here: On the first, the problem of EBM in psychiatry is a pragmatic worry that arises in view of the complexity of the determinants of human behavior and the limited capacity for observation. If this is the worry, though, it can be overcome to a greater or lesser extent within psychiatric practice. The second worry consists in the thought that humans pose a constitutive problem for EBM in psychiatry. However, I argue that this worry turns out to rest on assumptions about human behavior that are not unproblematic in themselves. Thus, UI is underpinned either by a pragmatic worry that can be overcome to some extent, or else it is underpinned by certain assumptions that are problematic, if not altogether wrong. This means that UI cannot be founded on a constitutive point about persons—at least, it does not seem to be, if it arises from a concern about applying generalizations to individual human beings.But there is a very different type of worry that might underpin UI, one that does not issue from considerations about the relation between the general and the particular. UI theorists could be worried about specific... (shrink)

Development of interpersonal trust among children and adolescents The main purpose of the present article is to introduce a topic related to the development of interpersonal trust among children and adolescents. Although this subject, since the beginnings of psychology considered as an academic discipline, has been regarded as an essential component of human functioning, there are still very few theoretical and empirical studies that approach the issue from a developmental point of view. In this paper the three-dimensional conceptualization of interpersonal (...) trust is provided. Furthermore, the article highlights the past and current theoretical and empirical research on the development of interpersonal trust in infants, preschool and school-age children. Finally, some challenges are presented in the field of interpersonal trust studies. (shrink)

In the year 2006, the American Psychological Association published a series of Research Briefs brochures to make available to the public short outlines on contemporary psychological studies of themes relevant to the United Nations’ mission. One of the items that was listed and given a considerable attention within the psychological fi eld was ‘forgiveness’. That initiative, despite the fact that forgiveness has been considered rather a theological issue, has generated a great interest among psychologists, thus leading them to undertake some (...) projects on forgiveness. In accordance with this concept of forgiveness, we chose in this research to investigate an individual’s ability to forgive as related to a basic human value. The study involved 274 Italian adolescents between 14 and 19 years of age. To measure variables involved in the research we used the following instruments: Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations Inventory, The Marital Offence-Specifi c Forgiveness Scale adapted to the adolescents’ sample, Trait Forgiveness Scale, and Portrait Values Questionnaire. The results obtained in the study show that forgiveness is positively related to selftranscendent and conservation values, and negatively correlated with self-enhancement and openness to change values. (shrink)

I discuss Dumouchel's defense of a notion of trust as an action.

In this paper I argue that Wittgenstein's aim in the aspect-perception passages is to critically evaluate a specific hypothesis. The target hypothesis in these passages is the Gestalt psychologist Köhler's "isomorphism principle." According to this principle, there are neural correlates of conscious perceptual experience, and these neural correlates determine the content of our perceptual experiences. Wittgenstein's argument against the isomorphism principle comprises two steps. First, he diffuses the substantiveness of the principle by undermining an important assumption that underpins this principle, (...) namely, that there is a unitary concept of seeing. Next, Wittgenstein argues that some forms of aspect-perception involve recognitional capacities, the exercise of which is normatively constrained. The normative nature of aspect-perceiving plays a pivotal role in Wittgenstein's rejection of the isomorphism principle. Aside from the clear exegetical benefits gained from identifying the target hypothesis in the aspect-perception passages as the isomorphism principle, construing the remarks in the way suggested here is also philosophically interesting in its own right: it shows Wittgenstein engaging directly in the mind–body problem, construed as the problem of intentionality. (shrink)

Trust is a complex attitude that has emotional, cognitive and moral dimensions. A difficulty to reduce trust to a simple emotional attitude is that trust raises normative pressures: if someone asks you to be trusted you feel the normative pressure of not letting him or her down, and if someone trusts you, you feel the normative pressure of honoring his or her trust. These normative pressures seem to have an irreducibly social character: pressures are effective insofar as they may raise (...) emotions of shame in those who violate the norm of trust and resentment and contempt in those who are victim of the violation. In this paper I will investigate the relation between the affective dimension of these normative pressures and their moral dimension by arguing that an important moral asymmetry exists between the duty to trust and the duty to be trustful. (shrink)

CONCERN ABOUT THE WELL-BEING OF FAMILIES HAS BEEN A CONSTANT refrain in the history of the United States. Change in family forms often has been regarded as a breakdown of the family and a harbinger of social decay. In each historical period, a family form has been identified as an ideal in contrast to which other forms of family have been found deficient, even dysfunctional. Social policies have been designed to reward "good" families and discourage "bad" ones. Today, the increase (...) in single-mother families, the high divorce rate, and the percentage of children living in poverty often are cited as evidence of the breakdown of the family and abandonment of family values because of a culture of "inordinate individualism." The Marriage Movement particularly represents this view. In this essay I first describe this approach to family values, its use of social science to support its claims, and the influence of this perspective on certain liberal Christian proposals for family ideals. I argue that family ideals assume race, gender, and economic privileges that are not available to all. By ignoring socioeconomic realities for many people, these ideals may mask and reinforce unjust inequalities. In fact, the themes and policies of the defense-of-marriage movement fit nicely with the neoliberal political economy that developed in the second half of the twentieth century. I argue that church and social policies that value families must connect the well-being of all families with a commitment to gender equality and economic justice. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that persons diagnosed with a personality disorder ought to be held responsible for their actions because these actions are voluntary. Defending this claim, Hannah Pickard contends that exercising choice and control are definitive of voluntary action, and that the behaviors that are constitutive of PD are behaviors over which we have choice and control. Thus PD behaviors are voluntary, and on this basis, their agents can be held properly responsible for this type of behavior. In (...) what follows, I examine this claim with reference specifically to agents who display impulsive behavior, where this behavior is taken to be diagnostic of antisocial personality disorder... (shrink)

This article will examine the claim that personal autonomy is impaired by a paradigmatic instance of serious psychopathology – namely, the condition of being delusional – in light of the hierarchical conception of personal autonomy. This conception of personal autonomy aims at yielding value‐neutral judgements about freedom and self‐governance. I will argue that when viewed from the perspective of this specific conception of autonomy, delusions do not necessarily impair an agent's personal autonomy. In order to establish this claim, I will (...) probe the general idea that delusional subjects are beset by a mental disease that is rationally incapacitating, to which the hierarchical theorist might appeal. I argue that, understood within the parameters set by the commitment to value neutrality, this idea fails to provide support for the claim that delusion necessarily impairs personal autonomy. One contribution this article makes to the effort of understanding how delusion impairs personal autonomy is to help us pinpoint the ways in which our value commitments inform our judgements of impaired personal autonomy in delusional agents. (shrink)

This article will examine the claim that personal autonomy is impaired by a paradigmatic instance of serious psychopathology – namely, the condition of being delusional – in light of the hierarchical conception of personal autonomy. This conception of personal autonomy aims at yielding value‐neutral judgements about freedom and self‐governance. I will argue that when viewed from the perspective of this specific conception of autonomy, delusions do not necessarily impair an agent's personal autonomy. In order to establish this claim, I will (...) probe the general idea that delusional subjects are beset by a mental disease that is rationally incapacitating, to which the hierarchical theorist might appeal. I argue that, understood within the parameters set by the commitment to value neutrality, this idea fails to provide support for the claim that delusion necessarily impairs personal autonomy. One contribution this article makes to the effort of understanding how delusion impairs personal autonomy is to help us pinpoint the ways in which our value commitments inform our judgements of impaired personal autonomy in delusional agents. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to critically evaluate John Campbell's (2002) characterization of the sense of demonstrative terms and his account of why an object's location matters in our understanding of perceptually-based demonstrative terms. Campbell thinks that the senses of a demonstrative term are the different ways of consciously attending to an object. I will evaluate Campbell's account of sense by exploring and comparing two scenarios in which the actual location of a seen object is different from its perceived (...) location. I do this in order to motivate the following point: Campbell's characterization of the sense of a demonstrative term turns sense into a psychologistic notion. As a consequence of this, it is difficult to see how sense could underwrite reference. In short, I shall be arguing that Campbell's account of the ways of perceiving an object is simply inadequate as an account of the Fregean notion of sense, according to which the senses of a demonstrative term are the different ways of thinking about an object. (shrink)

En este artículo me ocupo inicialmente de la teoría de la esclavitud de Aristóteles en el libro i de la Política, con el fin de mostrar la utilización de dos procedimientos: uno dialéctico, a partir de la discusión con Platón, y otro retórico, con la utilización de metáforas y testimonios con los que configura el marco epistemológico de su teoría. Luego, me concentraré en un asunto por esclarecer: la diferencia ente los endoxa, la tesis y el testimonio. Al describir el (...) método dialéctico en los Tópicos, Aristóteles precisa el significado de los términos endoxa y tesis. Por su parte, en los libros i y ii de la Retórica, Aristóteles se ocupa del testimonio. Por consiguiente, identificaré estos dos tipos de procedimientos, los tipos de pruebas y las conclusiones en el libro i de la Política de Aristóteles, a partir de las características elaboradas en los Tópicos y en la Retórica. (shrink)